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1. The rise of political economy analysis for development assistance
Political economy analysis has been a favourite instrument among 
donors of development aid since roughly the turn of the century. Donors have 
emphasised the usefulness of such forms of analysis because they realised 
that their focus on the formal aspects of the social and political organisation 
of countries had caused them to overlook important elements of the 
“political economy” of these countries.2 As a result, political and governance 
reform programmes, which had become part and parcel of the agenda of 
development under the post-Washington consensus, turned out to be much 
less effective than anticipated.
The call for donor agencies to “look behind the façade”3 of formal 
institutions in developing countries has thus come as part of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. It was argued that the effectiveness of development 
assistance policies would be enhanced if the realities of social and political 
power structures in developing countries were mapped and fed into the 
design of governance reforms targeting those countries. A more or less 
tacit assumption was that political economy analysis would enable donors 
to identify potential pockets of resistance to the reforms that they were 
advocating – hence improving the chances of getting reforms accepted.4
Examples of political economy approaches adopted by donors include 
the Drivers of Change approach developed by the UK’s Department for 
International Development in the early 2000s, the Strategic Governance and 
Corruption Analysis adopted by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007, 
and the World Bank’s approach to the political economy of policy reform and 
its problem-driven governance and political economy analysis, presented 
in 2008-09. The Demand for Good Governance programme, implemented 
under the aegis of the World Bank, with active participation of Australia’s aid 
agency, AusAID, has attempted to implement insights from political economy 
analysis in development policy.
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A key element of most or all of the approaches to political economy 
analysis appears to be their identification of different “layers” of analysis: 
beneath the daily events in every political system, there are the institutional 
arrangements (the “rules of the game”) that impact on day-to-day politics by 
influencing the policy options that politicians have. Even more fundamental 
are so-called “structural” elements, which relate to the history of the country 
under discussion, its natural resource endowment, and the power distribution 
across social groups. Improving the understanding of the rules of the game, 
and more fundamentally the structural features of developing countries, is 
believed to be the key contribution made by political economy analysis.5
2. The problem with political economy analysis
The political economy approaches that were adopted by development 
agencies demonstrate various weaknesses.6 First, problems exist in the 
design and application of the instruments adopted by several aid agencies. 
Second, difficulties arise in translating the lessons of political economy 
analyses into concrete policies of reform. Third, the core assumptions of most 
political economy analysis actually work against the correct identification of 
potential reform coalitions in the developing countries being targeted by the 
aid agencies. These three weaknesses are discussed below.
The political economy of donor agencies
The first major problem with the implementation of political economy 
analysis in recent years is related to the way in which such analysis is 
embedded within the instruments available to donor agencies. Essentially, 
this problem calls for a political economy analysis of the donors themselves, 
as the interests of and conflicts within donor governments need to be 
understood to see why the implications of political economy analysis are not 
likely to be followed to their logical conclusions.
Donor agencies need to be perceived as creatures with special features 
within the realm of government. In the words of William Easterly, donor 
agencies are in the business of “moving money” (Easterly, 2002). As a result 
of their mandate, staff incentives in the aid agencies are significantly related 
to the disbursement of funds allocated to them for development projects and 
programmes. The everyday practice of donor agencies forces them to be more 
concerned with the implications of their “logical frameworks” than with 
the environment they work in. For donors, “doing development” is, first and 
foremost, implementing programmes and projects
The perceived need to spend money – increasingly through so-called 
budget support modalities, which are felt to be most in line with the 
objectives of the Paris Declaration, such as alignment and ownership7 – can 
easily come into conflict with the conclusions derived from political economy 
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analysis. Recent controversies over budget support arrangements to regimes 
engaged in foreign military operations (such as Rwanda) or found to be 
practising corruption (such as Uganda) illustrate how government agencies 
may feel the impact of conflicting policy principles.
Apart from the bureaucratic tensions between pressure to spend 
and accountability requirements, donor agencies are subject to greater 
influence due to the role they play in their national political environments. 
Development assistance policies need to be understood as part of the foreign-
policy framework of their governments. Hence, decisions on how and where to 
allocate aid are part of the foreign-policy equation. Foreign policy is generally 
understood as an instrument to further a country’s strategic and commercial 
interests, and development assistance can only escape from the foreign-policy 
parameters to a limited extent, as much research on the impact of donor 
interests, recipient needs and normative ideas on aid allocation has shown.8 
It is not surprising that decisions on development assistance are often guided 
at least as much, if not more, by donors’ perceived geostrategic and economic 
interests as they are by their desire to “do good” in the countries of the global 
South.9 Moreover, the relatively lowly position of development agencies in the 
pecking order of policy making reduces their leverage in budget negotiations 
vis-à-vis other government departments – such as credit-insurance agencies 
– which have a much easier job in justifying their activities in terms of the 
national interest.
Likewise, the relative weakness of development agencies can be observed 
in the application of political conditionalities related, among other things, to 
human rights norms. One example is the short-lived freezing of the UK’s aid 
disbursement to Rwanda over allegations that the Kagame government has 
been involved in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although 
the evidence about Rwanda’s involvement was very stark – prompting Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands to maintain their aid freeze – the UK’s Secretary 
of State for International Development indicated after barely one month that 
there was sufficient proof that Rwanda had “engaged constructively with the 
peace process” and that resumption of the GBP 16 million in budget support to 
the country was therefore justified (Blair, 2012).
The political economy of donor-recipient relations
The second factor affecting the relevance of political economy analyses is 
the dynamics inherent in donor-recipient relations. This relationship, which 
has been defined by many as one of dependence, has a major impact on the 
ability of donors to influence the course of reforms in developing countries.
Dependence has been assumed too easily to imply a complete 
acquiescence by recipient governments to the policy objectives of the donors. 
Such an interpretation of donor-recipient relationships neglects the tools 
A GOVERNANCE PRACTITIONER’S NOTEBOOK: ALTERNATIVE IDEAS AND APPROACHES © OECD 201586
 PUTTING POLITICAL ECONOMY TO USE IN AID POLICIES
that recipient governments possess to serve their own interests, however. 
The powerful instruments available to recipient governments were clearest 
during the Cold War, when allegiance to one of the superpowers brought 
advantages in terms of foreign aid allocations. Yet even after the end of the 
Cold War, recipient governments have retained important means to look after 
their own interests. Apart from the obvious strategic interest of the West in 
particular natural resources – now more and more subject to competition 
with emerging economies such as China – recipient governments have played 
the card of “the politics of the mirror”. In the rather cynical words of Chabal 
and Daloz, which seem to have mileage in relation not just to Africa but to 
regimes across the developing world more broadly:
This consists essentially in addressing the foreign ‘other’ – in this 
case, potential aid donors – in the language that is most congenial 
and, crucially, most easily reinforces the belief that they (outsiders) 
understand what Africa needs. Thus it was that Africans conspired to 
support the colonial notion that they were all divided into discrete and 
identifiable ‘tribes’ and, later, convinced their colonial masters that they 
intended to run the politics of their newly independent countries on the 
principles of multi-party parliamentary systems. Thus it was too that 
some African leaders became overnight the proponents of scientific 
socialism or adhered wholeheartedly to the proposals for development 
projects which came their way. (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: p. 117)
Dependence regularly leads to the assumption that governance reform 
can be used to neutralise vested interests by installing technocratic, 
“apolitical” rule. Thus, market-oriented precepts of public sector reform, 
performance-based financing and results-based accountability – which are 
all related, in one way or another, to New Public Management, or what Cooke 
and Dar, among others, have called the “new Development Management” 
(Cooke and Dar, 2008; Gulrajani, 2011) – are used to legitimise governance 
reform as a condition of development assistance. In many cases, however, 
donor agencies and reform-resistant power holders end up being “strange 
bedfellows”.10 Reform programmes that seem to comply with the demands 
issued by donors may be relatively easily hijacked by special interest groups, 
which appear to be playing along with the donors but are mainly motivated 
by their own interests. The way in which the later “oligarchs” benefited 
from privatisation policies in Russia in the 1990s is probably the starkest 
example of how reform programmes are seized to serve the interests of 
particular elites. Similar examples – possibly less extreme but very likely 
equally devastating – can be found in the implementation of development 
programmes, such as in the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance 
Programme in Cambodia and participatory budgeting programmes in 
Mataram, Indonesia.11
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The political economy of reform coalitions
The third major problem concerning donors’ political economy 
analysis relates to the nature of reform and the driving forces behind the 
establishment of reform coalitions in developing countries. Here, one of the 
most important issues concerns the assumption that development can be 
defined in terms of “public goods” characteristics. The assumption seems 
to be that Pareto-optimal solutions can be found in development strategies 
if donors, in co-operation with recipient governments, apply the correct 
technical instruments to bring about development. Poverty reduction, as the 
main target of contemporary development polices, can thus be perceived as 
non-exclusive and non-rivalrous – and thus subsumed under the public goods 
framework – since it actually makes everyone better off.12
The understanding of development in terms of a public-goods logic is 
essentially apolitical, since it fails to recognise that easy, Pareto-optimal 
outcomes are not so obvious. Development is, rather, a process that is 
inevitably conflict ridden. The main reason for dissenting with the optimistic 
assessment of donor agencies is that development presupposes the existence 
of a particular institutional order which benefits some social-economic 
groups more than others. The spreading of the fruits of development more 
generally – that is, to groups which have traditionally been marginalised and 
disenfranchised – would essentially imply a restructuring of this institutional 
order. Groups that have traditionally benefited from the existing social, 
economic and political institutions will perceive change as inimical to their 
interests, and thus will attempt to ward off reform. The restructuring of 
the institutional order is an inherently political process – understood in the 
classical Lasswellian sense of the process that determines who gets what, 
when and how13 – and cannot, therefore, be seen as a merely technical 
undertaking, which produces easy efficiency-optimising solutions.
The main flaw of mainstream political economy analysis, which is 
intimately connected to the apolitical understanding of development, is 
that the political process can be understood in liberal/pluralist terms. The 
pluralist theory of politics, which sees the political process as an essentially 
benign struggle for power among groups, is insufficient to understand the 
difficulty that the marginalised and disenfranchised experience trying to get 
access to the political arena in the first place. As a result of the pluralist bias, 
conventional political economy approaches assume that governance reform 
can be achieved by engaging with enlightened technocrats, who can be won 
over to the side of the well-intended donors by promises of development 
assistance.
One example of an approach to governance reform for development 
purposes is the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP), which was 
established in July 2009 and is funded by the Australian government 
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with the help of other donor agencies.14 The DLP has chosen an explicitly 
political starting point for its approach to governance reform,15 but is clearly 
buying in to the pluralist assumptions underlying much of today’s political 
economy analysis. As Leftwich and Hogg argue in a background paper 
for the programme, the main challenges for achieving economic growth 
and social development in developing countries are defined as “collective 
action problems. If these problems are to be resolved, enough leaders, elites 
and reform agents – often with different initial interests and coming from 
different sectors – have to work collectively and co-operatively” (Leftwich and 
Hogg, 2007: p. 5). In their view, many developing countries lack leaders with 
“wider ‘national’ goals”. Yet, they argue that:
where enough leaders and elites are able to generate positive “synergies” 
within and between the interests, organisations and institutions of both 
the state and the private sector, on the basis of shared social purposes, 
they are able to form “developmental”, “growth” or “reform” coalitions, 
capable of devising or reforming institutions which promote economic 
growth and social development across a range of sectors and challenges. 
(Leftwich and Hogg, 2007)
In a similar vein, the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance 
demonstrates a similarly pluralist orientation. The focus of this programme is 
not so much on elites, but rather on the impact of civil society as a mechanism 
to hold governments accountable and achieve better development outcomes. 
As the World Bank’s website describes the aims of the programme:
“Demand for Good Governance” (DFGG) refers to the ability of citizens, 
civil society organisations and other non state actors to hold the state 
accountable and make it responsive to their needs. DFGG encompasses 
initiatives that focus on citizens as the ultimate stakeholders and 
include activities relating to information disclosure, demystification 
and dissemination; beneficiary/user participation and consultation; 
complaints handling; and independent and/or participatory monitoring. 
… DFGG aims to strengthen the capacity of NGOs, the media, local 
communities, and the private sector to hold authorities accountable 
for better development results. DFGG activities include development 
approaches that focus on citizens as the ultimate stakeholders for better 
governance. DFGG mechanisms can be initiated and supported by the 
state, citizens or both but very often they are demand-driven and operate 
from the bottom-up. (World Bank, 2014)
In contrast to the political economy approach sketched above, the rest 
of this paper is informed by a structural political economy perspective, 
which rejects the conflict-free conception of development. This perspective 
understands development as a permanent process of institutional restructuring, 
with the aim of achieving resource redistribution. This process, which requires 
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particular elites to give up certain privileges in favour of the poor, involves 
conflict. If development agencies seriously take up the reform of institutions as 
an objective, they will need to get enmeshed in the political struggles that result 
from the expected opposition of (parts of) the elite that do not wish to give up 
their privileges.
3. Structural political economy and the politics of (structural) reform
The structural political economy perspective advocated here calls 
for a reorientation of the approach to governance reform. Nowhere is the 
implication of this clearer than in the approach to the politics of reform and 
the identification of reform coalitions. The approach does not start from the 
assumed objectives of particular elites, as in the Developmental Leadership 
Program, or from the possible counterweights that can be organised through 
civil society action, as in the Demand for Good Governance programme. 
Rather, the starting point of the structural political economy perspective is 
the identification of sets of elites in relation to their position in the national 
structure of power. The assumption is that a useful way to determine power 
positions is by relating these to some sort of material basis – be it their 
ownership of capital, their access to natural resources or their command 
of the strong arms of the state. Existing governance arrangements work in 
the interests of the dominant power holders, while subordinate groups (the 
poor, indigenous and other minority groups, in many cases also women) are 
marginalised and generally fail to get access to the formal decision-making 
structures.
If governance reform is the purpose, then clearly reformers are the natural 
focus of any analysis. Several types of reformers can be distinguished, as well 
as several forms of alliances between donor agencies and reformers. A major 
distinction is that between dedicated and tactical reformers. Dedicated reformers 
are those groups, whether power holders or the marginalised sectors of 
society, with a genuine interest in reform. Among those reformers there are 
idealists, who believe in long-term goals of social change, and pragmatists, who 
have similar long-term aims, but also consider the importance of achieving 
short-term improvements, even if that would require them to compromise 
on some of the longer-term objectives. Tactical reformers are in essence 
opportunists, who see that the forming of alliances with donors can bring them 
greater advantages than the support of the ruling groups. The long-term 
objectives of these opportunists are not so much a radical transformation of 
the existing social, economic and political order, but they have a short-term 
interest in some of the advantages that the alliance with the donors may offer 
them, either in terms of resources, political exposure or prestige.
The types of alliances depend on the nature of reform-oriented groups. 
Very likely, the likelihood of success of reforms sponsored by donors is 
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influenced by the type of alliance that can be forged with reform-oriented 
groups, as well as by the weight that such groups can assemble for reform. 
The relation among types of reformers, types of alliances and likely outcomes 
is given schematically in Table 1.
Table 1. The politics of reform alliances
Types of reformers Types of alliance Likely outcome
Idealists: interested in reform 
that advances long-term social 
change.
Form dedicated alliances only 
with ideologically like-minded 
actors; likely to reject tactical 
alliances.
Success to be expected only 
where they are able to cause 
social revolution (e.g. Khomeini-
type “mobilisation of the 
masses”).
Pragmatists: interested in long-
term social change but also in 
short-term gains.
Form both dedicated and tactical 
alliances.
Success dependent on 
mobilisation of anti-regime 
forces. Likely to lead to intra-
regime struggle for power, and 
possibly political instability 
(e.g. democratisation in 
developing countries).
Opportunists: commitment 
is contingent and tactical, as 
interests are short term and self-
interested, and long-term goals 
are unrelated to reform agendas.
Form tactical alliances. Change of rulers and rules 
rather than change of regime 
and constitution (e.g. Arab 
Spring in Egypt and Tunisia). 
Defection likely if reform is 
no longer seen as useful. 
Opportunities for improving the 
situation of marginalised groups
The main implication of this approach is that outside forces are dependent 
on domestic alliances if they wish to influence the direction of any reform 
process. For donor agencies, this implies that they will need to take sides if 
they are truly interested in making an impact on governance reform. Thus, 
they need a strategic assessment of the power of pro-reform alliances, as well 
as of anti-reform opposition alliances.
Given that different types of reformers are likely to engage in different 
strategies for governance reform, the options for donor agencies that wish 
to support reform-oriented groups can be ranged on a continuum. At one 
end of the continuum is supporting idealist reformers in a declaratory way 
and providing financial support for those reformers to organise. While 
such an approach will enable donors to keep their hands clean, Table 1 also 
indicates that the likelihood of such a strategy bringing about reforms is 
rather slim. At the other end of the continuum is the situation where donors 
are required to dirty their hands by siding with opportunist elites that have 
been occupying roles in oppressive or highly corrupt regimes. Given the 
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role of these opportunists in the national balance of power, the likelihood 
of achieving results is arguably greater, yet such a strategy may be resisted 
because of the impact on the reputation of those donor governments from 
siding with representatives of regimes that are considered objectionable by 
their domestic constituencies. Case studies presented elsewhere illustrate 
that, in attempting to duck the issue, donors often end up failing to produce 
any concrete positive reforms for the poor and marginalised at all (Hutchison 
et al., 2014: Chapters 5-7).
The argument may be illustrated by focusing on the possible approach of 
donor agencies to the promotion of democratisation processes. Democratisation, 
understood as the increasing influence of greater parts of the population 
on decision making, is likely to be resisted by the elites in control of an 
autocratic regime. These ruling elites, who control the main power resources 
(such as economic assets or control of security forces), will feel threatened 
in their power position as a result of the demands for greater influence by 
marginalised groups, particularly if the latter constitute the vast majority of 
the population. The role of the middle classes in most developing countries 
is still likely to be limited, though growing as a result of greater economic 
dynamism over the past decade. As a result, the potential for change resulting 
from mobilising the middle classes can be assumed to be relatively small.
A structural political economy analysis may offer tools to help uncover 
the dynamics involved in such a democratisation process. The typology of 
reformers sketched above may help identify several other groups besides 
the reform-resisting ruling powers. Groups pressuring for democratisation 
because of ideological convictions belong to our category of idealists. They 
support fundamental, long-term democratic reforms and greater respect 
for political rights, aimed at providing more opportunities to the poor 
and marginalised for influencing the outcome of political processes. The 
pragmatists are those groups in favour of democratising the polity, but 
which also value the introduction of short-term improvements in the life 
of the poorer parts of the population, brought about, for instance, through 
the adoption of certain redistributive social policies. Pragmatist reformers 
would be willing to support alliances that aim to get social policies adopted, 
where they consider these as the best approach in the given situation. The 
opportunists are those parts of the ruling class who have an interest in 
removing the clique that is in control of the state, but are not fundamentally 
concerned about democratising the political system. They may support 
reform, for instance the introduction of social policies or limited democracy, 
in order to weaken the grip on power of the incumbent autocrats.
Donor agencies interested in contributing to democratic reforms should 
aim to build alliances with those groups that are most likely to produce 
the desired outcome. Given the general weakness of the idealist reformers, 
supporting pro-democracy idealist groups may be morally comforting, 
A GOVERNANCE PRACTITIONER’S NOTEBOOK: ALTERNATIVE IDEAS AND APPROACHES © OECD 201592
 PUTTING POLITICAL ECONOMY TO USE IN AID POLICIES
but will often turn out to be politically ineffective. A different approach 
may, therefore, be required to install change in the political system of the 
developing country concerned. Building an alliance with both reform-minded 
pragmatists and opportunists may turn out to be the only way to create 
some sort of pro-poor political reform – even though such change may fall 
short of the original aims of democratisation. In the end, donors may have 
to get their hands dirty providing support to the opportunist elites, whose 
main objective is to replace the incumbents in power, in order to improve 
the plight of the poorest segments in a developing country. The balance of 
power between the pragmatists and opportunists will ultimately determine 
the extent of the reforms; external donor agencies will be able to exert only 
partial influence on the exact outcome of the reform process, and will need 
to acquiesce in their fairly limited role.
4. Putting political economy to use or the road to nowhere?
Does structural political economy leave us without any hope for 
governance reform in developing countries? While the approach outlined 
above does certainly give rise to a fair degree of scepticism, there is probably 
no need to be entirely negative about the leverage of donor agencies and see 
political economy approaches as no more than a purely academic exercise.
The first lesson that can be learnt from a serious engagement with 
political economy analysis is that development should not be understood 
rather naïvely as a process that will bring about improvement in the lives of all 
parts of a population over a relatively short time span. Although it is tempting 
to think about development in largely positive terms, everyone involved in 
the aid industry should recognise that development is a conflictual process 
of reordering economic and social relations. As such, development is not a 
conflict-free public good, but is inevitably political in nature.
For example, among the presently developed countries, many people 
would be convinced of the benefits that development has brought in terms 
of the level of wealth, health and education. This should certainly not be 
denied, but the plight of “underclasses” in those same societies indicates 
that the fruits of development do not automatically “trickle down” to all 
individuals, and that exclusion mechanisms are still very powerful even in 
the most developed countries. The “discovery” of the urban underclass of 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit the southern United States in 2005 
brought home to many that not all US citizens had shared in the benefits of 
economic growth. Likewise, repeated reports on undocumented migrants in 
European countries indicate the presence of an underclass even in inclusive 
welfare states.16 These examples illustrate the persistently political nature of 
development at all levels of economic progress.
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The awareness that development must be conceived in outright political 
terms necessitates the adoption of a political economy perspective which 
zooms in on the resources and instruments that people have, or lack, to 
obtain a fairer share of social wealth. Such an analysis emphasises the 
various dimensions of governance reform that can be laid out. Using the 
frequently applied distinction between the “here and now”, the “rules of 
the game” and the “structural factors” that various donor instruments for 
political economy analysis use, some lessons for those attempting to reform 
governance in developing countries can be drawn.
The nature and extent of governance reform differs across the various 
political economy layers. At the level of the “here and now”, reform relates 
to a change of leadership. The “rules of the game” relate to a deeper layer 
of countries’ political economy, and here governance reform would imply 
changes in the constitutional order. At the most fundamental political 
economy layer, where the “structural factors” are located, reform would 
address such issues as the distribution of resources, inequality and the 
adverse treatment and discrimination of parts of the population. Moving 
from the here and now towards these structural factors, the social impact 
of governance reform becomes more profound and obtains a more clearly 
political dimension (in the sense that it has an impact on “who gets what, 
when and how?”) – thus, the deeper the political economy layer, the more 
conflict governance reforms are likely to cause.
In these terms, the conclusion is that some donor agencies, despite 
their rhetorical commitment, generally shy away from getting involved in 
deeper governance reform processes. The main reasons for their difficulty 
in engaging with politics derive from their own incentive structure and 
their development-oriented outlook. These donor agencies are likely to use 
political economy analysis mainly at the rhetorical level, and will use the 
knowledge it generates primarily for preparing their staff working in aid-
recipient countries. For them, political economy analysis will not have a great 
impact on their policies with regard to their partner countries. In the terms 
of the title of this section, such donor agencies find themselves on the road 
to nowhere.
If donor agencies are serious about the need for governance reform and 
wish to engage with the political marginalisation of the poor in developing 
countries, they may want to proceed on the road laid out by political 
economy analysis, and actively apply the insights derived from it. The 
concrete use of political economy analysis has the capacity to make aid more 
effective as well as more directly beneficial to the poor. In many cases pro-
poor policies require a critical attitude towards the ruling elite in developing 
countries, as their approaches tend to be quite harmful to the cause of poor 
and marginalised segments of the population.
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A structural political economy approach would guide donors searching 
for reformers who are able and willing to engage seriously with pro-poor 
policies. Idealist reformers are probably the easiest to identify, but they 
are also the least influential among reform-oriented groups. Idealists will 
be found in certain civil-society organisations, and empowering such 
organisations may be a first strategy that donor agencies can adopt. Their 
activities would very likely be twofold. First, some civil-society groups 
could engage in advocacy for the cause of the poor and marginalised. The 
objective of supporting such groups would be to enhance awareness among 
the wider population of the living conditions and limited access of the poor 
to the political system, in order to influence policy making in the longer run. 
In the second place, civil-society organisations could be recruited for the 
implementation of programmes and project aimed at the poorest parts of 
society.
Structural political economy analysis can also provide development 
agencies with a better understanding of the location and the nature of 
opportunist groups, as well as the way to win them for the cause of pro-poor 
governance reform. Such opportunists may be tempted to engage in tactical 
alliances with donors if their short-term interests run parallel with those 
of the aid agencies. Such a situation may exist when a specific part of the 
elite notice that their engagement with the pro-poor policies of the donors 
will enhance their own political power base among the poor. This could be 
true, for instance, for elites originating from a region of a developing country 
where many of the poor are concentrated. Donors need to be aware of the 
tactical nature of alliances with opportunist reformers, and of the risk that 
the opportunist elites may rather easily shift allegiance away from the donor 
agencies if the alliance is no longer considered to be beneficial to them.
The relative ineffectiveness of dedicated alliances with idealists and 
the expected volatility of tactical alliances with opportunists indicate that 
building alliances with so-called pragmatist reformers is preferable. Unlike 
idealists, pragmatists are not only interested in fundamental reforms, but 
also in piecemeal changes in what they feel is the right direction. In contrast 
with the opportunists, their engagement with donors is not just tactical and 
self-serving. Pragmatists are very likely the prime mover for governance 
reform in developing countries. Political economy analysis may help identify 
pragmatist groups in or associated with the elite who are supportive of 
the pro-poor governance reforms supported by donor agencies. As the 
pragmatists’ agenda may conflict with the interests of other parts of the elite, 
who are primarily interested in maintaining the status quo and their own 
position in power, the engagement of donor agencies with the pragmatists 
may result in a struggle for power within the regime and, at least in the short 
run, increased political instability.
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The outcome of such a political struggle within a regime is not certain, 
and depends on the political resources that pro- and anti-reform groups 
manage to mobilise. It is likely that donor agencies will come to be seen as 
part of the political struggle as they take sides with pragmatists pushing for 
governance reform. Committed donors, who see the battle against forms of 
patronage, nepotism and corruption as inherent to development, will need 
to be prepared to support the cause of the reform-oriented pragmatists and 
risk a deterioration of relations with those at the helm. They may come under 
attack from their own domestic constituencies that wish to maintain “good 
relations” with specific foreign regimes for strategic or commercial reasons. 
The need to navigate in rough waters both at home and abroad obviously 
requires that donor agencies can think and act politically, and persevere in 
their chosen strategies. The tendency of these agencies to minimise risks, 
as well as their relatively low place in the pecking order of foreign-policy 
making, are not the best ingredients for the assertive pursuit of development 
strategies. For the reasons sketched in this paper, most of the aid industry 
seems to be on a road to nowhere as far as political economy analysis is 
concerned, but hopefully some will be able to change course and put such 
analysis to good use.
Notes
1. This paper is based on and draws from the joint work undertaken by Wil Hout, 
Caroline Hughes, Jane Hutchison and Richard Robison as part of the project Achieving 
Sustainable Demand for Governance: Addressing Political Dimensions of Change, which 
was supported by the Australian Development Research Awards (ADRA). The paper 
reflects the ideas published in: Jane Hutchison, Wil Hout, Caroline Hughes and Richard 
Robison, Political Economy and the Aid Industry in Asia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014.
2. Cf. Copestake and Williams (2014).
3. This term is used in, among others, Harth and Waltmans (2007).
4. This approach comes out very clearly in Fritz et al. (2009).
5. For instance Warrener (2004) and Unsworth and CRU (2007).
6. See Hutchison et al. (2014: pp. 13-73) for a more elaborate discussion of these weaknesses.
7. Cf. Molenaers (2012).
8. See for example Clist (2011).
9. For example Lancaster (2007), Van der Veen (2011).
10. Cf. Robison (2009).
11. These cases are analysed in depth in Hutchison et al. (2014), pp.  84-93, 114-125 and 
139-145.
12. This seems to be the implication of the United Nations Development Programme’s work 
on global public goods, though this conclusion remains largely implicit (Kapstein, 1999).
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13. See Lasswell (1951). The first sentence of Lasswell’s work is: “The study of politics is the 
study of influence and the influential”.
14. See “About the Developmental Leadership Program”, DLP website, www.dlprog.org/
about-us.php (accessed 29 October 2014).
15. The DLP defines politics as “all the activities of conflict, negotiation and co-operation 
which occur when people with different interests, ideas, power and influence have not 
only to shape and abide by common institutions, but also to take decisions about how 
resources are to be used and distributed and about how power is to be gained and used” 
(Leftwich and Hogg, 2011: p. 2).
16. For example PICUM (2010).
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